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I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 1995, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar signed "truth-insentencing" legislation which, he contended, would "keep violent offenders behind bars where they belong."' The new law increases
punishment for certain crimes, and according to proponents, offers the
promise that Illinois' criminal laws will tell the public the "truth" about
the actual length of sentences. Supporters also contend that the new
law will both restore confidence in the criminal justice system by allowing the public and victims of crime to understand the real penalties
imposed for crimes, and reduce crime rates by keeping violent
offenders in prison longer-a strategy known as incapacitation.2
1. Gary Marx, Edgar Signs a Stricter Truth-in-Sentencing Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21,
1995, § 2, at 1; see also Pub. Act No. 89-404, § 40, 1995 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 3936, 393637 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/3-6-3 and 5/3-6-3.1 (West
Supp. 1996)); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME: 24 RECOMMENDATIONS
TO STRENGTHEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-10 (July 28, 1992) (report by Attorney General
William P. Barr, during the 1992 Presidential campaign, popularizing "truth-in-sentencing" plan).
2.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION-PENAL CONFINEMENT

AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995) (discussing incapacitation and the surrounding

policy debate). Illinois has implemented this strategy, to some degree in ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3.1(a) (West Supp. 1996). In Illinois, opponents of the
bill argued that Illinois already had truth-in-sentencing, because the Unified Code of
Corrections ("UCC") specified that prisoners who behave in prison would serve one-half
of the sentence imposed, and that judges therefore imposed a term weighing the fact that
it would be cut in half. As a consequence of the new law, judges may merely cut in half
the sentence imposed to reflect actual time which they desire the offender to spend in
custody. Such reductions could not occur in a number of cases because of mandatory min-
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The new law alters Illinois' sentencing structure by amending the
early release sections of the Unified Code of Corrections (the
"UCC").' Currently, Illinois controls the actual length of imprisonment through two mechanisms. Early release, a "back door" mechanism, allows prisoners to be released before their sentence is completed. Good conduct credits are an example of this mechanism.
"Front door" methods establish, or purport to establish, the length of
sentence when it is imposed. Examples of this method include statutory classifications of offenses by seriousness and statutory provisions
which set out the maximum and minimum sentences a court can impose.4 The truth-in-sentencing law focuses on "backdoor" mechanisms. It eliminates both the day-for-day good conduct credit, which
allows prisoners to trim their sentence by one day for each day they
serve at good behavior,5 and the additional 90 or 180 days of good
conduct credit for "meritorious service," which the Illinois Department
of Corrections ("IDOC") awards prisoners. 6 Persons convicted of
offenses not covered by truth-in-sentencing will continue to have their
sentences reduced by good conduct credit. For instance, under the
new law, murderers will serve 100% of the sentence imposed by a
judge, persons convicted of violent crimes such as aggravated criminal
sexual assault or criminal sexual assault will serve about eighty-five
percent of their sentence, and persons convicted of burglary will serve
less than one-half of the sentence imposed by the court. 7
The new law also establishes a Truth-in-Sentencing Commission
(the "Commission"), consisting largely of law enforcement officials,
which is charged with assuring that "criminals serve the sentences
handed down by the courts. ''8 While this charge could indicate that the
State is leaning towards extending truth-in-sentencing to all offenses, it
should be viewed in the context of the costs that such a program would
entail. For instance, the IDOC estimated that the current truth-in-sentencing law will cost the State $320 million and add 3774 inmates to
I

imum sentences, below which the judge cannot deviate. Opponents also contended that
the bill would eliminate prisoners' incentive to behave in prison, that it would not
significantly reduce crime, and that it would cost Illinois millions--or billions-of
dollars. Marx, supra note 1,at I.
3. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/3-6-3 and 5/3-6-3.1 (West Supp. 1996).
4. See infra notes 19-64 and accompanying text.
5. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996). Under the
law, prisoners in the 85% category shall receive "no more than 4.5 days of good conduct
credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment." Id.
6. Id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(3).
7. Id. § 5/3-6-3(a).
8. Id. § 5/3-6-3.1(a).
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Illinois prisons in its first decade. 9 The IDOC predicted that, over the
same period, the costs of extending truth-in-sentencing to all offenses
would approach six billion dollars.'0 Moreover, these new demands
on the IDOC come at a time when the State's prisons are already filled
to near capacity." In this context, the Commission's additional charge
of examining the possibility of "changing sentences in order to more
accurately reflect the actual time spent in prison" could be construed as
an indication that the State will consider lowering the sentences set
forth in the Code to reflect the actual time served
by prisoners, and
2
eliminating good conduct credit for all offenses.
This Article reviews Illinois' truth-in-sentencing law and the sentencing structure into which it falls. It will not attempt to engage in the
controversial and enormous task of evaluating the merits of various
strategies of incapacitation, nor will it weigh the shift in power from
judges to prosecutors which has flowed from offense-based sentencing and mandatory sentencing policies. 3 Illinois' complicated and
confusing sentencing system has been built up by the unsystematic
accretion of sentencing policies and enhancements over the last three
decades. Rather than clarifying the Code, "truth" adds yet another
layer to this system. The accretion of sentencing policies is in large
measure the product of a legislature which constantly responds to public perceptions about crime by passing new laws. Without debating
the merits of such democratic responsiveness, one must recognize that
it has added costs to the criminal justice system beyond the obvious
costs of prison construction. The profusion of unrelated policies has
9. Marx, supra note 1, at 1.
10. H.B. 3252, 89th II. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1995) (Illinois Department of Corrections, Corrections Impact Note). The Illinois Department of Corrections projected
that House Bill 3252, which would have created across-the-board, truth-in-sentencing,
would cost $5.8 billion over the next 10 years. Id.
11. See infra part IV.C.
12. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3.1(a)(c)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis
added).
13. The shift to sentences-especially mandatory sentences-based on the charged
offense, rather than the offender, has also shifted power from judges to prosecutors. The
prosecutor, not the judge, selects the charge. When the consequences of that charge are

fixed regardless of the specifics of the offender or the crime, the judge cannot alter the
sentencing outcome. The prosecutor, however, may do so by filing a different charge, or
by reducing charges, a power often used in plea bargaining. See, e.g., Symposium, The
Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War on Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REV.

301, 313 (1995). See also, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964-65
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasizing the power prosecutors wield
when influencing sentencing); Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in
the Criminal Justice System-The Role of Prosecutors in Sentencing Educations, CRIM.

JUST., Fall 1990, at 3 (discussing how the federal sentencing guidelines have increased
prosecutors' power in controlling the length of sentences).
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obscured the debate over how best to spend the State's limited amount
of money to best incapacitate--or rehabilitate--offenders. It has also
resulted in an unnecessarily complex and unpredictable sentencing
system so arcane that few lawyers-not to mention the public or the
specific legal consequences flow from
accused-can understand what
4
specific criminal conduct.'

II. LAYER UPON LAYER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
SENTENCING POLICY

Over the last 150 years, Illinois sentencing policy has shifted with a
number of major revisions, but it has mainly grown by accretion.'" It
has also generally progressed towards setting forth the actual length of
a sentence at the time of sentencing, and, in fixing the amount of punishment, it has come to focus less on the offender than on the offense
charged.' 6 In its most extreme form, this trend has resulted in a number of "mandatory minimum" terms of imprisonment, which require a
court to sentence an offender convicted of certain offenses to serve a
minimum number of years in a penitentiary, regardless of individual
circumstances. 7 Supporters of this evolution might argue that these
changes produce greater predictability in the amount of punishment
which will follow as a consequence of a given offense, and that it
provides more clarity about the consequences of criminal conduct to
crime victims, offenders, and the public. Over the last thirty-five
years, however, this trend towards clarity has been diluted as a
14. Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the
Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 905 (1992) (arguing that the guidelines are complex
and confusing and they result in a federal bureaucracy of sentencing that is void of judicial discretion).
15. See infra parts II.A-F and III.
16. See infra part IV.B. This focus on offense, rather than offender, and complex sentencing consequences caused by the accretion of sentencing schemes, creates a rift between sentencing policies and provisions in the Criminal Code and the Illinois Constitution, which require that punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
and recognize an offender's potential for rehabilitation. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § II
("All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 720, § 5/1-2(c) (West 1992) (indicating that one of the general purposes of the
criminal code is to "[pirescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitative possibilities
among individual offenders"). See also Susan M. Witt, Illinois' Aggravated Battery of a
Senior Citizen Statute: Out of Sync with the Sentencing System, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
1161, 1178. Witt notes that, "(t)urning its collective head from circumstances of the
offense, the legislature rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's position that punishment
should fit the offender rather than the crime alone." Id. (citing People v. LaPointe, 431
N.E.2d 344, 350 (ii. 1981)).
17. See infra parts II.C-F and III (discussing the evolution of sentencing in Illinois).
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number of new sentencing mechanisms-both front door and back
door-have been added, one on top of another, to the existing UCC
and Criminal Code.' 8
A. 1833 to 1961-IndeterminateSentencing and the
Opening of the Back Door
From 1833 until 1872, Illinois sentencing law offered little or no
predictability in the amount of punishment which would follow as a
consequence of a given offense because, for most offenses, the length
of imprisonment was determined by a jury. 9 In 1872, the legislature
created a schedule of good-time credits allowing a prisoner to be
released before he or she had served the period of incarceration which
had been imposed. This change constituted the first back door sentencing mechanism. 20
The use of good time credits was part of a nationwide prison reform
movement which sought to sort prisoners who could be rehabilitated
and restored to the community from those who were fit only for continued punishment and incapacitation. 2 ' While New York passed the
first good time law in 1817, most good time laws were passed after
1850.22 By 1869, twenty-three states had similar laws. 23 Under
Illinois' 1872 plan, a prisoner who behaved in prison was released one
month early from a one-year sentence, or three months early from a
two-year sentence.24 A prisoner facing the almost hopeless prospect
of a very long sentence was given even greater incentive to behave.
For instance, a prisoner facing a twenty-year term could have
it
2
reduced to eleven years and three months if he behaved in prison.
In 1895, the legislature expanded the back door sentencing mechanism when it adopted an explicit indeterminate sentencing model that
allowed prison officials to release a prisoner at any time.26 The almost
18. See infra parts IL.B-F and III.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 168 (1845); see also James B. Haddad, Commentary,
Some Lessons from the History of Illinois Sentencing Laws, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 2325 (1981) (tracing the history of Illinois' sentencing system).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, para. 45 (1877); Haddad, supra note 19, at 23. Since the
actual term of imprisonment was determined at the time of sentencing, it was as predictable as a front door mechanism. The law set an explicit schedule of days by which
sentences were to be reduced. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, para. 62 (1896).
21.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

160-62

(1993).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, para. 62 (1896); FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 159.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 501 (1898); 1895 Ill. Laws 158 (codified at ILL. REV.
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total lack of predictability of this system was somewhat tempered by
an amendment in 1917 which set forth minimum periods which a prisoner had to serve before he or she would be eligible for parole.27 In
1941, Illinois again expanded the back door mechanism. Juries retained their power to set terms for serious felonies, while, for less
serious felonies, authorized terms spanned a wide range of years, with
the actual time of release determined by the prison authorities. A burglar, for instance, could be sentenced to one year to life in the penitentiary.29
B. The Criminal Code of 1961
In 1961, the legislature extensively revised the criminal laws when it
passed the Criminal Code of 1961.30 The new code added a degree of
predictability to sentencing by allowing judges to take over sentencing
from juries (except in capital cases), and by limiting the terms of imprisonment which judges could impose to a statutory range of years.3
The new code added a degree of clarity to sentencing by including an
individual penalty section for each offense. 32 But it also added unpredictability by expanding the back door mechanism because all sentences were "indeterminate. 33 Except in cases where the offender was
sentenced to consecutive sentences for separate offenses, all offenders
were eligible for parole within eleven years and three months? 4

STAT. ch. 38, paras. 498-509 (1895)).
27. Sentence, Commitment, and Parole Act of 1917, H.B. 1029, 1917 Il1.Laws. 353;
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 498(1) (1920); Haddad, supra note 19, at 24. Haddad
notes that release was based "upon the condition that the warden keep in touch with the
prisoner for at least six months." Id.
28. H.B. 103, 62d Ill. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., 1941 Ill. Laws. 560 (amending ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 802 (1941)); Haddad, supra note 19, at 24.
29. Haddad, supra note 19, at 24 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 84, 802
(1941)).
30. Criminal Code of 1961, 1961 Ill. Laws 1983-2049 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, paras. 1-1 to 35-1 (1961)).
3 1. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-1 (1961) (indicating that the penalty
for kidnapping was between one and five years); John P. Heinz et al., Legislative
Politics and the Criminal Law, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 321 (1969); Haddad, supra note
19, at 23.
32. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-1(c) (1961) (indicating that the rape
penalty is set forth in the same section as the substantive offense); Marvin E. Aspen,
New Class X Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344, 345 (1978).
33. Aspen, supra note 32, at 345.
34. Haddad, supra note 19, at 25.
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C. The Unified Code of Corrections
On January 1, 1973, a new sentencing scheme, the UCC, became
effective, making sentencing more predictable.3 ' The new law limited
the power of judges or parole authorities to be lenient in the most
serious cases, yet granted judges powers in those cases to impose long
sentences. 36 It also allowed parole authorities to retain significant discretion over the determination of when to release those prisoners who
were facing the longest terms of imprisonment." The UCC retained
indeterminate sentencing, but removed the penalty provisions from
individual offenses and placed them in the new code.38 It classified
felonies into four categories and set murder into its own category.39
The new code set relatively high minimum terms of imprisonment of
fourteen years for murder and four years for Class 1 felonies; no
maximum terms were set for these offenses. 40 This structure prevented judges from imposing too "lenient" a penitentiary sentence,
while it allowed them to set a very high maximum term. While parole
authorities also could not be too lenient in releasing these serious
offenders before the minimum term, they retained enormous discretion
in deciding when to release a serious offender after the minimum term
had expired. This structure additionally provided those offenders facing the longest imprisonment a strong incentive to behave or to rehabilitate themselves.
For the less serious Class 2, 3, and 4 felonies, the UCC imposed a
minimum penitentiary term of only one year-if the judge elected not
to sentence the offender to probation. 4' Maximum terms for these categories were set at twenty years for Class 2 felonies, ten years for
Class 3, and three years for Class 4.42 Thus, as the seriousness of the
offense decreased, so did the power of the judge to impose a very long
sentence; parole authorities also had less ability to hold these offenders
for long periods. This limit on discretion was assured by a provision
which limited the extent to which a judge could increase the minimum
sentence in Class 2 and 3 felonies. The higher minimum term could
35. The Unified Code of Corrections, Pub. Act No. 77-2097, 1972 Ill. Laws 758-838
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1973)).
36. See Aspen, supra note 32, at 345.
37. Id. at 345 n.18 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-1 (1977)).
38. Id. at 345 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977)).
39. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(b) (1977)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(c) (1977)).
42. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(b)(3)-(5) (1977)).
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not exceed one-third of the maximum term set in that case by the
court.43 For example, the potential sentence for a Class 2 felony could
range from one to twenty years, which would give the parole board
very broad discretion." The one-third provision, however, restricted
parole or back door discretion by requiring the court to impose a sentence within a range of, for instance, two to six years.45 The UCC
also gave judges the power to impose double the maximum terms of
imprisonment in cases where the offender inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury upon another person, or used a firearm in
commission of a felony. 46
D. Class X
Only five years later, in 1978, Illinois extensively overhauled its
sentencing laws, again making sentencing more predictable. 47 According to then-Governor Thompson, the new "Class X" law would "tell
48
criminals that we are not going to fool around with them any longer."
The law abolished the primary back door mechanisms of indeterminate
sentencing and the parole system.49 It continued, however, to use a
form of back door release-day-for-day good time. 50 This provision
allowed a prisoner to be released one day early for each day he served
on good behavior.5' While still a back door mechanism, this system
was very predictable, allowing a fairly accurate assessment of the offender's length of imprisonment at the time of sentencing. It retained
the incentive for prisoners serving long sentences to behave in order to
gain early release. The Class X law also authorized the IDOC to
release prisoners ninety days earlier than their release date based on
good conduct credit for "meritorious service, 52 a provision which
evolved into a virtually automatic reduction of sentence.53
43. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(c)(3)-(4) (1977)).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977).
45. Aspen, supra note 32, at 345 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(c)(3)(4) (1977)).
46. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2(a) (1977)).
47. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, 1977 111. Laws 3264-3368 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1979)).
48. Marcia Stepanek, Thompson Proposes Tough Anti-Crime Laws, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
6, 1977, § 1, at 1.
49. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, 1977 I11.Laws 3289 (deleting old section and replacing it
with good time credit in section 1003-6-3).
50. Aspen, supra note 32, at 349 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-6-3(a)(2)
(1978)).
5 1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-6-3(a)(2) (1978).
52. Id.
5 3. Aspen, supra note 32, at 349 n.67; see also ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-
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The cornerstone of the Class X law was the new category encompassing serious offenses, such as rape and armed robbery, for which
the law was named. Under this provision, persons convicted of Class
X offenses were ineligible for probation, and were required to serve a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment which the court would set
at between six and thirty years. The Class X provision strengthened
the trend towards more predictable punishment, for not only was back
door parole authority curtailed, so too was front door judicial
discretion in deciding whether to incarcerate Class X offenders.55
The Class X law also made Illinois' front door sentencing more
predictable by requiring judges to sentence offenders within a more
strictly limited range of years.56 For instance, under the 1973 law, a
non-capital murder conviction carried a term of imprisonment from
fourteen years to a limitless maximum; parole authorities decided when
to release the offender.57 Under the Class X law, a person convicted
of murder faced a fixed term of between twenty and forty years,58 a
term which would be cut in half if the offender behaved in prison.59 In
cases where certain aggravating factors were present, the offender
could face natural life in prison or death. 6°
The Class X law made sentencing significantly more predictable for
lesser crimes as well. Under the 1973 law, Class 1 felonies carried a
term of imprisonment which ranged from a minimum of four years to a
limitless maximum. 6 1 With the one-third requirement, an offender
sentenced to imprisonment thus could have faced a term of eight to
twenty-four years, with the parole authorities deciding when, after
eight years, the offender would be released.62 Under Class X, a judge
could sentence a Class 1 offender to probation, or to a fixed term of
imprisonment of between four and fifteen years. Class 2 felonies,
which had carried an indeterminate term of between one and twenty
years, now carried a fixed term of between three and seven years. For
6-3 (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth meritorious good time provisions); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 20, § 107.210 (Barclays July 22, 1994) (setting forth meritorious good time
provisions).

54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(3) (1978).
55. Aspen, supra note 32, at 347-48.
56. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, 1977 Ill. Laws 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-8-1 (1978)).
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1977).
58. Id.
59. Id. paras. 1005-8-1(b)(2) & 1005-8-1(c)(2).
60. Id. para. 1005-8-1(a)(1).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(4) (1977).
62. Id. para. 1005-8-2.
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Class 3 felonies a fixed term could be set at between two and five
years, while for Class 4, it could range between one and three years.63
The Class X law channeled judges' discretion in setting a term of
years for a sentence by specifying aggravating and mitigating factors
which they were to consider. For instance, mitigating factors included
the fact that an offender had led a law-abiding life or acted with strong
provocation, while the fact that an offender inflicted serious bodily
injury or had a record of prior offenses were aggravating factors.'
E. Class X and Special Sentencing Enhancements
While the Class X law increased the fixed and predictable minimum
terms of imprisonment which accompanied conviction for a given offense, it also allowed judges to impose longer terms of imprisonment
based not upon the statutory offense, but upon the character of the offender's conduct, or his previous criminal behavior. These provisions
authorizing additional consequences include extended terms, 65 consecutive sentences, 66 enhanced penalties for repeat offenders, 67 and
"habitual offender sentencing"6-an early version of the recent "threestrikes-you're-out" laws.
1. Extended Terms
Under the Class X law, a judge was allowed to impose a term
longer than the statutory maximum-an "extended term"-in cases
where the offense was "exceptionally brutal or heinous" or "indicative
of wanton cruelty. '69 For instance, a judge could impose an extended
term for murder at a fixed number of years between forty and eighty,7"
which would be reduced by about one-half by good conduct credit. 7 '
A judge could also impose an extended term of between thirty and
sixty years for a Class X felony.72

63. Aspen, supra note 32, at 347-48.
64. Id. at 350; Patricia Hartman, Factors in Aggravation and Mitigation: A Trap for
the Sentencing Judge, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1984).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2 (1978).
66. Id. para. 1005-8-4.
67. Id. para. 1005-5-3(c)(6).
68. Id. paras. 33B-1, 1005-5-3(c)(5).
69. Id. paras. 1005-8-2(a), 1005-8-1(a)(1).
70. Id. para. 1005-8-2(a)(1).
71. Id. para. 1003-6-3.
72. Id. para. 1005-8-2(a)(2).
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2. Consecutive Sentences
Before Class X, a judge could sentence an offender to serve consecutive sentences for two convictions only if the offenses were not
part of a single course of conduct.73 Under the Class X law, however,
even if both offenses were part of the same course of conduct, the
court could sentence consecutively if (1) at least one offense was a
Class 1 or Class X felony, and (2) the victim was severely injured.
This amounted to longer sentences for more serious felonies involving
physical harm, because the offender would serve one sentence after the
other, rather than two at the same time or concurrently.74
3. Repeat Offenders
Under Class X, mandatory prison sentences were to be based not
only on the offense at hand, but also upon an offender's previous
convictions. One new "enhanced Class X" provision required a judge
to sentence as a Class X offender any Class 1 or Class 2 offender over
the age of twenty-one if he or she had previously been convicted two
times before of either a Class 1 or Class 2 felony.75
4. Habitual Offender Sentencing
A more severe provision focusing on the offender's previous convictions required a judge to impose a life sentence for an offender's
third conviction for a serious violent felony, such as murder, armed
robbery, or rape. 76 Although "habitual criminal," or "three-strikesyou're-out" laws had existed since 1885, when Ohio passed a habitual
criminal law,77 they did not gain national attention until 1994, when a
number of states followed the lead of California in passing similar
laws.78

73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4(a) (1977).
74. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4(a) (1977) with ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4 (1978); see Aspen, supra note 32, at 348.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(c)(6) (1978); see also Aspen, supra note
32, at 348 (reviewing Class X provisions).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 33B-1, 1005-5-3(c)(5) (1978); see also Aspen,
supra note 32, at 348 (reviewing Class X provisions).
77. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 161; 1885 Ohio Laws 236-37.
78. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120
(1994); see also Alan C. Smith, More than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional Convictions to Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United States, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1323, 1324 n.4 (1995) (noting that 17 states have enacted or debated a "Three
Strikes" measure).
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F. 1978 Through 1995-The Accretion of Policies
From 1978 until 1995, Illinois sentencing laws continued to evolve
piecemeal, without regard to the entire structure, as the General
Assembly added individual sentencing enhancements. While by no
means an exhaustive survey of the numerous enhancements passed
during this period, the following section summarizes illustrative
examples.
1. Ad Hoc Mandatory Imprisonment
Under the Class X law, imprisonment was mandatory for the most
serious class of offenses. In 1981, the General Assembly began
adding mandatory imprisonment for offenses in less serious categories
on an ad hoc basis. This change began when the General Assembly
required judges to impose a term of imprisonment for the Class 1
felony of residential burglary. Regardless of mitigating factors, a
judge was required to sentence an offender to four years imprisonment.79 With this amendment, the General Assembly may have
opened the door for further encroachments into judicial discretion in
the sentencing of less serious classes of offenses. For instance, the
General Assembly has required judges to sentence anyone found guilty
of possession with intent to deliver five or more grams of cocaine, a
Class 1 felony, to four years in prison. 0 In 1995, the General
Assembly enhanced the penalty for the Class 1 felony of compelling
gang membership to require a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment upon conviction.8 '
2. The Location of the Offense--"Safe" Zones
Since 1985, the General Assembly has added numerous sentencing
enhancements based upon the location of the offense, rather than the
nature of the offender or the offense itself. While this concept began
as an enhancement to combat drug sales in schools, it has expanded to
include a wide range of areas, and seems popular with the General
Assembly, as indicated by a number of recent proposals to add still
more "safe zones."

79. Pub. Act No. 82-238, 1981 Ill. Laws 1275-77 (codified at ILL. REV.
para. 19-3(b) (1981)).
80. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3 (West Supp. 1996); ILL.
ANN. ch. 720, § 570/401(c)(2) (West Supp, 1996).
81. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-6.1 (West Supp. 1996).

STAT.

ch. 38,

COMP. STAT.
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a. School Zones
The roots of the "safe zones" concept date from the original Illinois
Controlled Substances Act of 1971,2 which focused on drug sales to
children, regardless of location., That law permitted, but did not require, judges to double the sentence of a person eighteen years of age
or older who was convicted of delivering a controlled substance, such
as cocaine, to someone under eighteen who was at least two years
younger than the offender.83 It required the actual delivery of drugs,
and focused on the ages of the parties involved8 4
In 1985, the General Assembly modified the law aimed at drug sales
to children, transforming it into the "safe school zone" law.8 5 The new
law deleted the requirement that the offender be at least two years older
than the person receiving the drugs, and added a new section which
applied to offenses committed on school grounds, or on a public way
within 1000 feet of a school.86 The 1985 law applied to offenders of
any age, covered possession of drugs and possession with intent to
deliver drugs, and contained mandatory sentencing enhancements and
mandatory terms of imprisonment.8 7 For instance, a person found
guilty of possession with intent to deliver between one and five grams
of a controlled substance would, under the Controlled Substances Act,
be guilty of a Class 1 felony, and face a sentence of probation, or if
other factors were involved, a possible term of between four and seven
years imprisonment.88 If the same person was found guilty of that
offense within the zone, he or she would be guilty of a Class X
felony, and a judge would then have to sentence that person to a term
of between six and thirty years in prison, regardless of the offender's
age or absence of a criminal record.89
The school zone concept has also been added to the assault and
various firearms statutes. A person who assaults a teacher on school
82. Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Pub. Act No. 77-757, 1971 I11.Laws 1538
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 1100-1603 (1971)).
83. Pub. Act No. 77-757, § 407, 1971 111. Laws 1538, 1563 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1407 (1971)).
84. Id.
85. Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Pub. Act No. 84-1075, § 2, 1985 I11.Laws
7116, 7119-20 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1407(a), (b) (1985)).
86. Id. See also Pub. Act No. 85-616, 1987 111. Laws 2700 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 56 1/2 para. 1407(b) (1985)) (adding "public park" to the areas covered by the
zone).

87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1407 (1985).
88. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/401(c)(2) (West 1992).
89. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/407(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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grounds, which, under Illinois law, means placing the teacher in
reasonable apprehension of battery, faces a penalty enhancement from
a Class C to a Class A misdemeanor.' A person who unlawfully sells
a firearm to a person under eighteen years of age, if the firearm is concealable or if the recipient does not have a license, faces a penalty
enhanced from a Class 3 to a Class 2 felony. 9' A person who carries a
handgun in his or her pocket or in a car is guilty of a Class 4 felony.
The penalty is enhanced, however, to a Class 3 felony if the act
occurred in a school zone.92 The courts have broadly construed the
coverage of the statute, finding that the safe zone includes colleges and
universities.9 3
b. Public Parksand Public Housing
In 1987 the General Assembly applied the coverage of the safe
school zone law to public parks. 94 Cocaine offenses were thus punished more severely if they occurred in a public park than in a private
yard or home. Two years later, the General Assembly extended the
zone to cover offenses committed within 1000 feet of "any residential
property owned, operated and managed by a public housing
agency." 95 Under that law, for example, a person convicted of possessing with intent to deliver one gram of cocaine in or around their
privately-owned home would be guilty of a Class 1 felony, and be
eligible for probation.' If the person was found guilty of that offense
in or around a school or public housing, however, he or she would be
guilty of a Class X felony, and a judge would then have to sentence
that person to at least six years in prison, regardless of the offender's
age or absence of a criminal record. 97
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, this statute did not violate
equal protection of the law. According to the court, it was reasonable
to enhance the penalty based on its location in an area with significant
narcotics activity. 98 The court also found that the statute did not
90. Id. §§ 5/12-1, 5/12-2(a)(3)(b).
91. Id. § 5/24-3(a), (i), (k).
92. Id. § 5/24-1(a)(4), (b), (c)(1.5).
93. See People v. Goldstein, 562 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (III. App. 5th Dist. 1990),
appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991).
94. Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Pub. Act No. 85-616, 1987 III. Laws 2700
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1407 (1987)).
95. Pub. Act No. 86-946, 1989 Ill.
Laws 5667, 5673 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
56 1/2, para. 1407 (1989)).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401(c)(2) (1989).
97. Id. para. 1407(b)(2) (1989).
98. People v. Shepard, 605 N.E.2d 518, 525 (I1. 1992).
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penalize persons based upon where they lived, because the enhanced
penalty was based only upon where the offense occurred. 99 The
enhanced penalties for offenses committed in parks and public housing
have also been extended to apply to numerous firearm offenses.' 00
For example, a person who carries a handgun in his or her pocket or in
a car is guilty of a Class 4 felony.'O° If the same act is0 2done in or
around public housing, it is enhanced to a Class 3 felony.
c. Rest Areas and Truck Stops
In 1992, the General Assembly expanded its safe zone concept to
include "truck stops" and "safety rest areas."'0 3 Under this law, a person faces enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed in, or within
1000 feet of, these zones.' 4 The zones covered are broad indeed.
For example, according to the statute, a "safety rest area" is "a roadside facility removed from the roadway with parking and facilities
05
designed for motorists' rest, comfort, and information needs."'
Offenders in possession of controlled substances likely drive within
1000 feet of innumerable zones during a moderately long drive,
constantly increasing and decreasing their criminal liability.
d. Aggravating Factorfor Zone Offenses
In 1994, the General Assembly greatly broadened the application of
the zone concept to cover two dozen additional offenses by allowing
judges to consider the fact that the offense occurred within a zone as an
aggravating factor at sentencing. 0 6 The General Assembly seems
99. Id. at 523.
100. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/24-1 (West Supp. 1996).
101. Id. §§ 5/24-1(a)(4), (b).
102. Id. §§ 5/24(a)(4), (c)(1.5).
103. Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Pub. Act No. 87-1225, 1992 I11.Laws 3843
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1407 (1993)).
104. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/407(a)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1996).
105. Id. § 570/407(a)(4).
106. Id. § 5/5-5-3.2(a)(16). The offenses covered are: Kidnapping-ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/10-1 (West 1992); Aggravated Kidnapping-id. § 5/10-2; Child
Abduction-id. § 5/10-5; Soliciting for a Juvenile Prostitute-id. § 5/11-15.1; Keeping
a Place of Juvenile Prostitution-id. § 5/11-17.1; Patronizing a Juvenile Prostitute-id.
§ 5/11-18.1; Juvenile Pimping-ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/11-19.1 (West
Supp. 1996); Exploitation of a Child-id. § 5/11-19.2; Aggravated Assault-id. § 5/122; Aggravated Battery-id. § 5/12-4; Heinous Battery-id. § 5/12-4.1; Aggravated
Battery with a Firearm-id. § 5/12-4.2; Aggravated Battery of a Child or Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Person-ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4.3 (West
1992); Intimidation-ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-6 (West Supp. 1996);
Compelling Organization Membership of Persons-id. § 5/12-6.1; Criminal Sexual
Assault-ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-13 (West 1992); Aggravated Criminal
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likely to continue to carve out more special zones for sentencing
enhancements, as evidenced by recent proposals. These proposals include safe zones for public transportation, a "Safe Retail Zone"' 7 for
retail shopping malls, and a proposal to create safe religion zones.'
3. The Use or Possession of Weapons
Illinois law has a number of sentencing mechanisms which come
into play both when dangerous weapons are illegally possessed under
the unlawful use of a weapon statute, and when they are used in the
commission of illegal acts under the armed violence statute. The line
between illegal use and illegal possession has been blurred, however,
since a 1978 amendment which extended armed violence to include the
possession, but not use, of a weapon during the commission of any
felony.' 9' The effect of this amendment has become especially pronounced as the penalties attached to armed violence have dramatically
increased." 0 For instance, judges must now impose a prison sentence
of fifteen years on a person found guilty of possessing any amount of
cocaine while in illegal possession of a handgun."'
Illinois has regulated the possession of firearms since at least 1881,
a policy that is based on the premise that weapons inherently dangerous to human life constitute a hazard to society sufficient to justify
their prohibition." 2 The foundation of the current laws regulating
firearms and other deadly weapons dates from a 1925 law, now codiSexual Assault-id. § 5/12-14; Criminal Sexual Abuse-id. § 5/12-15; Armed Robbery-id. § 5/18-2; and Armed Violence-id. § 5/33A-2.
107. See H.B. 584, 88th 111. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing that the
charge should be increased to a Class 2 felony if the firearm is illegally possessed in
retail zone); H.B. 586, 88th I11.
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1993) (enhancing penalties for
weapons offenses in retail zone).
108. The 1995-96 General Assembly is considering an amendment to ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/407, which would include churches, synagogues and other
places of worship in the current list of safe zones already provided for. S. 1296, 89th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1995). Currently, judges may consider the commission of a
crime near a place of worship as an aggravating factor in sentencing. ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5.3.2(c)(11) (West Supp. 1996).
109. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § i, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT.

ch. 38, para. 334-2 (1977)).

110. See infra notes 112-33 and accompanying text.
I 11. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-I (West Supp. 1996) (defining "armed
with dangerous weapon" as someone who carries a handgun or other small concealed
firearm); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-2 (West 1992) (defining the offense of
armed violence as one where the offender is "armed with a dangerous weapon [while] he
commits another felony"); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-3(a) (West Supp.
1996) (imposing a minimum 15 year imprisonment for armed violence).

112.

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

ch. 720, § 5/24 cmts. (West 1992).
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fled in the "unlawful use of weapon" statute." 3 The 1925 law constituted a regulatory scheme defining how and where even law-abiding
people could carry weapons." 4 For instance, it prohibited any person
from carrying a concealed handgun "on or about his person.""' 5 As
the purpose of the law was to control the hazard created by the presence of dangerous weapons, it did not matter that a person did not use
the weapon to commit an offense, only that he or she possessed it in
violation of the regulatory scheme." 6
Under the Criminal Code of 1961, the offense of unlawful use of a
weapon remained essentially the same; the illegal possession of a
handgun, for instance, was defined as a person carrying a handgun
"concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person," except
in the person's home or business.''7 Violators were guilty of a misdemeanor, unless they possessed a machine gun, sawed-off shotgun,
or bomb, in which case they faced the possibility of an indeterminate
prison sentence of one to five years." 8 Since 1961, the General
Assembly has more pervasively regulated the possession of dangerous
weapons through almost forty amendments." 9 Over the same period,
the General Assembly has increased penalties; in 1994, for instance,
the illegal possession of a handgun offense was increased from a misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 20
In 1967, the General Assembly added a new weapons offense,
aimed at the illegal use of a dangerous weapon, when it passed the
Armed Violence statute. As its name implies, the law focused on persons who carried a dangerous weapon when committing any one of
thirteen violent felonies, such as kidnapping, rape, intimidation, and
deviate sexual assault. 12 1 The law's essential effect was to require a
113. Id.
114. 1925 Ill. Laws 339, § 4 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 155 (1925)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 1961 11. Laws 1983, 2028 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(4)
(1963)).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(7), (b) (West 1961).
119. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/24-1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (listing
the amendments leading up to the present form of the law); JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES 505 (2d ed. 1993).
120. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/24-3.1(b) (West Supp. 1996).
121. 1967 Ill. Laws 2595, 2598 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33A-3
(1967)). The offenses covered were kidnapping-ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-1
(1967); aggravated kidnapping-id. para. 10-2; rape-id. para. 11-1; deviate sexual
assault-id. para. 11-3; aggravated assault-id. para. 12-2; aggravated battery-id. para.
12-4; intimidation-id. para. 12-6; compelling confession or information by force of
threat of force-id para. 12-7; theft-id. para. 16-1; theft of more than $150-id. paras.
19-1, 31-1, 31-6(a), or 31-7.
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prison sentence in these cases. A first conviction carried an indeterminate sentence of from two years in prison to a maximum sentence
which could be no longer than the maximum allowed for the same act
when committed by an unarmed offender.2 2 A second offense carried
a prison term of at least five years in the penitentiary.'23
Within eleven years, the statute had been transformed from its focus
on the use of weapons to commit violent crimes, to a broad statute
covering persons who commit any felony, even if non-violent, while
possessing a weapon. 124 The statute's name, however, remained
"Armed Violence." The expansion began in 1975, when the General
Assembly added an enhanced penalty which applied in cases where a
machine gun or sawed-off shotgun was used. 25 More significantly,
the new enhanced penalty applied beyond the original thirteen
offenses, to include forcible felonies-those involving the use or threat
voluntary manslaughof physical force or violence-such as murder,
26
ter, rape, burglary, and aggravated battery.1
Although the law's focus was still on the use of weapons to commit
violent crimes, the door had opened to further expansion. That
expansion came in 1978, when the General Assembly amended the
armed violence statute to cover non-violent offenses. 7 A person was
if he or she possessed a weapon and
guilty of armed violence
28
committed "any felony."'
The new law did not require that the offender use the weapon to
29
harm or threaten others, or that it be used to facilitate the offense.
The armed violence statute thus covered, for example, the simultaneLaws 2595, 2598 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33A-3
122. 1967 I11.
(1967)); see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. 1967 II1. Laws 2595, 2598 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33A-3
(1967)).
124. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 1, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 33A-2) (1979)); see also ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §
5/33A-2 (history notes) (West 1992) (defining elements of armed violence).
125. Pub. Act No. 79-1029, § 1, 1975 11. Laws 3133, 3133-34 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(7), (b) (1975)).
Laws 3133 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
126. Pub. Act No. 79-1029, 1975 111.
para 33A-2.1. (1976)). If a sawed-off shotgun or machine gun was used in a forcible
felony, the penalty became a Class I felony, punishable by from four years to any number of years in the penitentiary. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8(b)(2) (West 1975).
127. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, 1978 III. Laws 3269, § I (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 38, para. 33A-2 (1979)); see ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-2
(history notes) (West 1992).
Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
128. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, 1977 I11.
ch. 38, para. 33A-2 (1979)); see ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch, 720, § 33A-2 (history notes)
(West 1992).
1 29. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 33A-2 (West 1992).
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ous possession of any amount of cocaine and a handgun.130 Thus, the
line began to blur between the illegal use of weapons to commit crimes
and the illegal possession of weapons. This merging of categories of
criminal conduct gained added significance after a 131994 amendment to
the armed violence law greatly enhanced penalties.
Before the amendment, the simultaneous possession of even a small
amount of cocaine and a handgun was an armed violence offense, for
which an offender would face a six year Class X penalty, which
amounted to about two and one-half years imprisonment. 132 The new
law raised the penalty for such an offense from the six year sentence,
to a special category of Class X offense, which carries a mandatory
minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment. A person convicted of
armed violence for the simultaneous possession of any amount of
cocaine and a handgun thus faces a mandatory prison
sentence of
33
fifteen years, regardless of his age, or criminal record. 1
4. Gang Sentencing
Since 1989, the General Assembly has added new sentencing enhancements aimed at crimes related to gangs. 34 In 1989, it passed a
law which requires a judge to impose a prison sentence on offenders
convicted of a forcible felony related to gang activity. 31 In 1993, it
passed a law which authorizes judges to consider imposing a longer
sentence for offenses committed while the defendant was engaged in
gang-related activity. 36 In 1994, it again passed a law which allows
1 30. Id.; see ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/401 (West Supp. 1996).
131. Pub. Act No. 88-680, Art. 40, § 40-10, 1994 Iii. Laws 2750, 2791 (amending
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§5/33A-1, 5/33A3 (West 1992)).
132. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33a-2 (West 1992) (armed violence is
committed when any felony is committed with a dangerous weapon); id. § 570/402(c)
(possession of any amount-even a tiny amount--of cocaine is a Class 4 felony); id. §
5/33a-l(b) (West 1992) (a pistol is a category I weapon); id. § 5/33A-3(a) (armed
violence with a category I weapon is a Class X offense); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730,
§ 5/5-3(c)(2)(C) (a Class X offense requires imprisonment); id. § 5-8-1(a)(3) (the
imprisonment term is 6 to 30 years); id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(1) (this term would be reduced by
one-half; id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (it would also be cut by an additional 180 days).
133. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-2 (West 1992) (defining armed violence as committing a felony while "armed with a dangerous weapon"); id. § 5/33A-1
(defining "armed with a dangerous weapon" as carrying a category 1, II, or III weapon);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/33A-3 (West Supp. 1996) (imposing a minimum 15
year sentence for a category I weapon used in armed violence).
134. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
135. Pub. Act No. 86-863, § 3, 1989 M11.
Laws 4709, 4713 (codified at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(J) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996)).
136. Pub. Act No. 88-215, § 1, 1993 111.Laws 2312, 2313 (codified as amended at
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3.2(a)(15) (West Supp. 1996)).
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judges to impose extended terms of imprisonment on offenders considered to be gang leaders.' 37 That law also increased penalties for
"compelling gang membership" from a Class 3 to a Class 2 felony. 38
In 1995, the General Assembly again enhanced the penalty for this
offense to require judges to impose a mandatory minimum four year
term of imprisonment upon conviction. 39
5. Violation of Bail Bond
Legislators have also enhanced penalties for bail bond violators. If
an accused person is released on bail and fails to appear at trial, he or
she can face a stiffer sentence due to the bail bond violation."4° This
type of punishment originated in 1959, when the Illinois General
Assembly declared bail bond violators to be in contempt of court, a
finding already within a court's power.' 4' In 1961,42 1972, 43 and
1982,' 44 the General Assembly added specific penalty provisions, the
last specifying that the violation of bail bond should be punished one
class below the class of the offense for which the offender had been
granted bail.
The punishment for violating bail is thus related to the gravity of the
punishment which the offender sought to avoid. 45 The General
Assembly increased penalties in 1985 by mandating that courts impose
consecutive sentences for the original offense and for the violation.
The statute retained the express language reserving the court's power
to punish the same conduct as contempt. 46 In 1994, the General
137. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3.2(b)(8) (West Supp. 1996).
138. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 112-6.1 (West Supp. 1996) (amending the
offense of compelling organizational membership). Under this law, the penalty
increased from a Class 2 to a Class I felony for persons 18 or older who threaten someone under 18 to solicit or cause them to join a gang. See id. Also under this law, the
penalty for the offense of intimidation remains a Class 3 felony, but the highest possible penalty is increased from five to ten years. Id.
139. Id. § 5/12.6.1 (making such persons ineligible to receive probation, conditional discharge, or periodic imprisonment as a sentence).
140. Id. § 5/32-10.
141. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 615a (1959).
142. Criminal Code of 1961, S.B. No. 897, 1961 I11.Laws 2447-48, § I (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-10 (1961)).
143. Pub. Act No. 77-2638, § I, 1972 III. Laws 1717, 1762 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-10 (1973)).
144. Pub. Act No. 82-281, § 1, 1981 III. Laws 1633 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 32-10 (1981)).
145. See Pub. Act No. 82-281, § 1, 1981 Ill. Laws 1633, 1633 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-10 (1981)).
146. Pub. Act No. 84-945, § 1, 1985 Ii. Laws 6020, 6021 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-10 (1985)). Also, under this law, judges are to impose consecu-
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Assembly added a Class 4 felony
offense for violating a condition of
47
bond by possessing a firearm.
6. Consecutive Sentences
Under the 1978 Class X law, judges were given the power to sentence consecutively for acts which were part of a single course of conduct if at least one offense was a Class 1 or Class X felony, and a victim was severely injured. 4 8 Ten years later, the General Assembly
further expanded judges' power to sentence consecutively by adding a
second category of offenses which could carry consecutive sentences
for acts arising from the same course of conduct-criminal sexual
assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 49 In 1995, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the 1988 amendment requires judges to impose consecutive sentences for both categories."5
In 1985, the General Assembly required judges to impose consecutive sentences when a person charged with a felony offense committed a separate felony while on bail.' 5 ' Thus, a person released on bail
facing a charge of possessing with intent to deliver less than one gram
of cocaine near a park, who commits the same offense again while on
bail, faces a mandatory four years imprisonment for each offense, and
these terms52must be served one after the other-a mandatory eight year
sentence.1

tive sentences when a person charged with a felony offense commits a separate felony
while on bail. Pub. Act No. 84-945, § 3, 1985 Ill. Laws 6020, 6030 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4(i) (1985)).
147. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/32-10(a-5) (West Supp. 1996). The sentence is upgraded to a Class 3 offense for second-time offenders. Id.
148. Aspen, supra note 32, at 348 n.61 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-84(a) (1978)).
149. See also Pub. Act. No. 85-1030, § 3, 1988 111. Laws 200, 203-04 (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4 (1989)); David Stevens, Mandatory Consecutive
Sentencing: Proposed Corrections Code Amendments, 83 ILL. B.J. 526 (1995) (noting
the courts' historical difficulties in interpretation of the statute and recommending new
statutory language).
150. People v. Arna, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (111. 1995); see also Stevens, supra note
149, at 526 (arguing that consecutive sentences are mandatory) (citing People v. Arna,
635 N.E.2d 815 (11. 1994), aff'd, 658 N.E.2d 445 (III. 1995)).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
152. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§ 570/401(d), 570/407(b)(2), ch. 730, §5/5-8l(a)(4) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
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7. The Nature of the Victim
a. Special CategoriesofAggravated Battery
Since the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961, the General
Assembly has amended the battery laws more than thirty times and has
53
enhanced penalties for cases where the victim fits special categories.
The misdemeanor offense of battery under Illinois law occurs when a
person causes someone bodily harm or makes physical contact with
someone in an insulting or provoking manner. 54 Aggravated battery,
on the other hand, is a felony offense. 5 5 Since the Code was adopted,
battery has been enhanced to aggravated battery when the victim fits
one of the following categories: school teachers and other school
employees, park district employees, Public Aid employees, State
Department of Children and Family Services employees, policemen,
firemen, corrections officers, paramedics and emergency medical personnel, people walking on public property or on a public way, public
transportation employees, persons of at least sixty years
of age, preg56
handicapped.
physically
the
and
judges,
nant women,
Special categories have also been added to cover cases where victims either under thirteen or over sixty years of age suffer great bodily
harm. In 1988, the General Assembly passed a law making aggravated battery of a senior citizen a Class 2 felony with a mandatory term
of at least three years imprisonment.' 57 In 1980, the General Assembly added the felony of aggravated battery of a child, a Class 2
offense, punishable by probation or a prison term of three to five
years.'
The offense covers cases where a child has been bruised,
burned, scalded, or dangerously shaken. 59 In 1990, the penalty was
enhanced to a Class 1 felony, punishable by a term of probation or a
153. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4 (West 1992) (discussing aggravated battery and listing the amendments leading up to the current statutory version).
154. Id. § 5/12-3.
155. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4 (West Supp. 1996).
156. Id.
157. Pub Act No. 85-1177, 1988 Ill. Laws 1403 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 720, § 5/12-4.6 (West 1992)); see also Witt, supra note 16, at 1163 (describing legislative action on this law, and policies arguing that mandatory terms are inappropriate
and unnecessary).
158. Pub. Act No. 81-1520, 1980 Ill. Laws 3953 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 720, § 5/12-4.3 (West 1992)), amended by Pub. Act No. 89-313, 1995 Ill Legis.
Serv. 3216, § 5 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch 720, § 5/12-4.3(a) (West
Supp. 1996)).
159. People v. Renteria, 597 N.E.2d 714, 718-19 (I1. App. 1st Dist. 1992); People
v. Herr, 409 N.E.2d 442, 444-45 (III. App. 2d Dist. 1980).
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prison term of four to fifteen years.? In 1995, the penalty was again
enhanced-to a Class X offense, punishable by a mandatory minimum
term of at least six years in prison.' 6' By also adding this offense to
the truth-in-sentencing bill, the General Assembly ensured that prison
terms will be almost doubled because no good-conduct credits will reduce Class X sentences imposed under this law. 62 Persons sentenced
under the law will, therefore, serve about five years and one month in
prison, which is equivalent to a non-"truth" prison term of about ten
and one-half years-a significant increase in the minimum term from
probation.
b. Enhanced Penaltiesfor Offenses Against
Police and Fire Officials
Twice within three years the General Assembly enhanced penalties
for certain offenses against police officers, firemen, and other officials. 163 In 1992, the General Assembly passed legislation drafted by
Cook County State's Attorney Jack O'Malley which enhanced penalties for offenses against this category of victim. The law raised the
minimum penalty in such cases to a mandatory term of natural life imprisonment for murder. It created an enhanced Class X term of fifteen
to sixty years imprisonment for an attempt to commit first degree murder against this category of victim, and an enhanced Class X term of
ten to forty-five years imprisonment for aggravated battery with a
firearm involving this category of victim. It also created an enhanced
Class X term of six to thirty years imprisonment for cases of
aggravated discharge of a firearm involving police or firemen.164
In 1994, the General Assembly passed legislation drafted by
Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and again enhanced penalties for
such offenses. 65 The penalty for attempted first-degree murder rose
from fifteen to sixty years to twenty to eighty years, an enhancement
160. Pub. Act. No. 86-1003, § 3, 1989 Ill. Laws 6826, 6828 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para 12-4.3 (1989)).
161. Pub. Act No. 89-313, § 5, 1995 111.Legis Serv. 3216 (West) (codified at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4.3 (West Supp. 1996)).
162. Pub. Act No. 89-404, § 40, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3941 (West) (amending ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/5-4-1, 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1992)).
163. Pub. Act No. 87-921, 1992 111.Laws 1769 (codified in scattered sections at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 (West 1992); Pub. Act No. 88-680, § 35-5, 1994 Ill. Laws
2750, 2782 (codified in scattered sections at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720 (West Supp.
1996)).
164. S. 1964, 87th Gen. Assembly; Pub. Act No. 87-921, § 1, 1992 I11. Laws 1769,
1769-74 (amending ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§ 5/9-1, 5/8-4(c)(1), 5/12-4.2,
5/24-1.2 (West 1992)).
165. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/8-4 (West Supp. 1996).

1996]

Truth-in-Sentencing

1009

which made it possible for the attempted murder of an official to carry
a longer prison term than murder. This second bill enhanced the
penalty for aggravated battery with a firearm in cases involving officials from the recently enacted ten to forty-five year sentence to fifteen
to sixty-five years. It also enhanced the penalty for aggravated discharge of a firearm from the recently enhanced six to thirty year sentence to ten to forty-five years."
8. Back Door Release by Offense
While the 1978 Class X law abolished the unpredictable back door
mechanisms of indeterminate sentencing and the parole system, it continued to use a predictable back door release system of good conduct
credit. 67 Good conduct credit was aimed at providing an incentive for
prisoners to behave, 68 but it has also been used to reduce prison overcrowding. 69 Even before the truth-in-sentencing law was enacted,
however, the good conduct credit system had begun to evolve into a
separate and complicated sentencing mechanism. Good conduct credit
came to be awarded based not on the good conduct of an inmate in
prison, but largely on the offense for which the inmate had been sentenced. This factor is known at the time of sentencing, and has nothing to do with an inmate's subsequent prison conduct.
This back door credit includes day-for-day good conduct credit,
which allows prisoners to trim their sentence by one day for each day
they serve on good behavior, 170 and an additional ninety or 180 days
of good conduct credit for "meritorious service" which the IDOC
awards prisoners.' 7 1 Day-for-day credits can be increased if a prisoner
enrolls in programs such as full-time drug treatment, educational programs, and prison industries. 172 Each day a prisoner eligible for this
credit is enrolled73 in these programs counts as a day and one-half
towards release.
166. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§ 5/8-4(c)(1), 5/12-4.2(b), 5/24-1.2(b) (West
Supp. 1996).
167. Aspen, supra note 32, at 347-48.
168. People v. Burton, 427 N.E.2d 625, 628 (111.App. 4th Dist. 1981).
169. FINAL REPORT, THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON CRIME AND CORRECTIONS 30 (1993).
170. Under the law, a prisoner in the 85% category shall receive "no more than 4.5
days of good conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment." ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
171. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
172. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 1992).
173. Id. IDOC may reduce a prisoner's sentence by an additional 180 days of good
conduct credit for "meritorious service" for most offenses. The Director, however, may
award only 90 days of good conduct credit for "meritorious service" for the following
offenses: first degree murder; aggravated criminal sexual assault; criminal sexual
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Even before the truth-in-sentencing law was enacted, the amount of
credit for meritorious service which an inmate could receive depended
on the offense for which the inmate was convicted. 74 For most
offenses, the IDOC awards 180 days of meritorious conduct credit.
For the following offenses, however, only ninety days of meritorious
conduct can be awarded:
first degree murder;
aggravated criminal sexual assault;
criminal sexual assault;
reckless homicide while under the influence of alcohol or any other
drug;
aggravated kidnapping;
kidnapping;
stalking;
aggravated stalking;
deviate sexual assault;
aggravated criminal sexual abuse;
aggravated indecent liberties with a child;
indecent liberties with a child;
child pornography;
heinous battery;
aggravated battery of a spouse;
aggravated battery of a spouse with a firearm;
aggravated battery of a child;
endangering the life or health of a child;
cruelty to a child; and
narcotic racketeering.'
Inmates' eligibility for day and one-half credit for participation in
approved prison programs also depended on the offense for which the
inmate was sentenced. 7 6 Before 1993, the offenses excluded from
assault; deviate sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual abuse; reckless homicide
while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug; aggravated kidnapping; kidnapping; stalking; aggravated stalking; aggravated indecent liberties with a child; indecent
liberties with a child; child pornography; heinous battery; aggravated battery of a
spouse; aggravated battery of a spouse with a firearm; aggravated battery of a child;
endangering the life or health of a child; cruelty to a child; and narcotic racketeering.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 1992); Pub. Act No. 89-404, § 40,
1995 Ill. Legis Serv. 3935 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(4)
(West Supp. 1996)).
174. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 1992).
175. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
176. Id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(4).
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this program were first degree murder, second degree murder, and
Class X felonies. In 1993, the General Assembly allowed inmates
convicted of second degree murder to gain the extra credits, removed
some offenses from eligibility for the credits, and increased the credit77
from 1.25 to 1.5 for each day a prisoner was enrolled in a program.
Since then, the General Assembly has removed additional offenses
from eligibility for day and one-half credit. The list of excluded offenses is now as follows:
offenses listed in truth-in-sentencing sections;
first degree murder;
a Class X felony;
criminal sexual assault;
felony criminal sexual abuse;
aggravated criminal sexual abuse;
aggravated battery with a firearm;
any predecessor or successor offenses with the same or
substantially the same elements; and
78
any inchoate offenses relating to the foregoing offenses.
III. TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING: THE FINAL LAYER
The Illinois truth-in-sentencing law 179 continues the trend towards
lengthening sentences by narrowing the back door for some offenses,
and by closing it for others. It creates four categories of offenses for
back door release.' s Depending on the category of offense for which
an inmate is sentenced, he or she will serve 100%, 85%, or 50% of
the sentence imposed.' 8 ' The law applies to offenses committed on or
after its August 20, 1995 effective date, 8 2 because to apply the law
otherwise would have violated the prohibition against ex postfacto
laws. 3 It thus does not apply to the 39,000 prisoners currently in the
Illinois Department of Corrections.

177. Pub. Act No. 88-311, 1993 111. Laws 2604, 2612 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN.

ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996)).
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
(1981);

id. § 5/3-6-3.
Id. §§ 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i), (ii), 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1)).
Id. § 5/3-6-3(a).
Id. §§ 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1).
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31-34
Barger v. Peters, 645 N.E.2d 175, 177-78 (111.1994).
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A. Category One-Murder
The new law eliminates all credits for those prisoners who fall
within the first category, which currently includes only first degree
murder. 84 Before "truth," a minimum sentence of twenty years for
murder would, with good conduct and meritorious conduct credits,
amount to nine years and nine months in prison.18 5 A twenty-year
sentence now will amount to twenty years in prison.'86 This system
now is the direct opposite of the State's original good time law, which
gave the greatest incentive to behave well in prison to those facing the
longest sentences by allowing them to receive the greatest amount of
good time. 87 It also raises questions about what incentive prisoners
will have to rehabilitate themselves, or to behave in prison, if they will
serve the same amount of time behind bars regardless of their
behavior.
B. Category Two -Selected Violent Offenses
A prisoner serving a sentence for selected violent offenses will
receive no more than four and one-half days of good conduct credit for
each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment. 8 8 This computation amounts to about eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed.
Before "truth," a prisoner sentenced to ten years imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault would serve about four years and nine
months in prison. 89 After "truth," the same sentence would amount to
about eight and one-half years in prison.' 90 Offenses in this category
include the following:
attempt to commit first degree murder;
solicitation of murder;
solicitation of murder for hire;
184. Inmates serving time for first degree murder "shall receive no good conduct
credit and shall serve the entire sentence imposed by the court." Pub. Act No. 89-404,
1995 111. Legis. Serv. 3934 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-63(a)(2)(i) (West Supp. 1996)).
185. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/5-8-1(a)(1), 5/3-6-3 (West 1992).
186. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/5-8-1(a)(1), 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West Supp.
1996).
187. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text; FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 159.
188. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
189. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-14 (West 1992) (establishing this
offense as a Class X felony); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West Supp.
1996) (setting the sentence for a Class X felony to be not less than 6 and not more than
30 years); id. § 5/3-6-3 (allowing most prisoners, regardless of the offense committed,
to receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of service while in prison).
190. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
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intentional homicide of an unborn child;
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child;' 9'

aggravated criminal sexual assault;
criminal sexual assault;
aggravated kidnapping;
aggravated battery with a firearm;
heinous battery;
aggravated battery of a senior citizen; and
aggravated battery of a child.' 92
C. Category Three -Maybe Truth: Offenses Requiring
a JudicialFinding
Some offenses may trigger the eighty-five percent requirement, depending on whether the judge "has made and entered a finding that the
conduct leading to conviction for the enumerated offense resulted in
great bodily harm to a victim.' ' 93 These offenses include the following:
home invasion;
armed robbery;
aggravated vehicular hijacking;
aggravated discharge of a firearm; and
armed violence with a category I or II weapon.' 94
This section recalls a previous law in effect during the 1970s, which
allowed a judge to impose up to twice the ordinary maximum term of
imprisonment if the defendant either inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury
upon another person or used a firearm in commis95
felony.
of
sion
19 I. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is a new offense which was added by
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-14.1 (West Supp. 1996).
192. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996)).
193. The court must make a finding "pursuant to subsection (c)(l) of section 5-4-1 of
this Code." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West Supp. 1996)
(emphasis added). Note that the Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois has upheld a
section of the Jail Good Behavior Act which bars good conduct credit for offenses
involving "physical harm." People v. Gaither, 582 N.E.2d 735, 742-43 (II. App. 5th
Dist. 1991) (construing ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 130/3 (West 1992)). Also

note that the General Assembly must set intelligible standards when it delegates to the
Department of Corrections decisions about whom to release through good conduct
credits. People ex rel. Colletti v. Pate, 201 N.E.2d 390, 393 (111.1964).
194. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West Supp. 1996).
195. Aspen, supra note 32, at 345 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1
(1977)).
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D. Category Four- Day-for-Day Credit Continues
The "truth" law does not apply to other offenses. For those
offenses, the awarding of day-for-day good conduct credit
continues. 96 For instance, persons convicted of burglary, theft, and
drug offenses will serve less than one-half of the sentence imposed by
the court. 197 Compare that sentence with "truth" sentences: murderers
will serve 100% of the sentence imposed by a judge, persons convicted of violent crimes such as aggravated criminal sexual assault or
criminal sexual assault will serve about 85% of their sentence.
IV. PEELING BACK THE LAYERS

The profusion of unrelated policies has resulted in an unnecessarily
complex and unpredictable maze of sentencing laws so arcane that few
lawyers-not to mention the public or the accused-can understand
what specific legal consequences flow from specific criminal conduct.
The new laws, and especially their mandatory nature, have enhanced
the prosecutor's power, reduced that of the judiciary, and focused
sentencing on the offense, not the offender. They have also obscured
the debate over how best to spend the State's limited amount of money
to best incapacitate---or rehabilitate-offenders.
A. A Complex Maze of Laws
The costs of the rapid and continuous growth of criminal laws was
highlighted in a 1992 concurring opinion by Illinois Appellate Justice
Steigmann, who discussed "the legislative frenzy" of new criminal
laws, focusing on the twenty-seven substantive amendments to the
drug laws which the General Assembly had passed in the preceding
four and one-half years. 98 Justice Steigmann pointed out the likelihood that the legislature creates drafting errors when it passes laws
without deliberation. He also decried the "confusion and uncertainty
these frequent changes engender," and warned of the additional time it
196. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West Supp. 1996).
For all offenses, other than those enumerated in subdivision (a)(2) committed
on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1995, the rules and
regulations shall provide that a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of his or her
sentence of imprisonment or recommitment under Section 3-3-9. Each day of
good conduct credit shall reduce by one day the prisoner's period of imprisonment or recommitment under Section 3-3-9.

Id.
197. Id. § 5/3-6-3(a).
198. People v. Liberman, 592 N.E.2d 575, 585 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1992)
(Steigmann, J., concurring), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 466 (111. 1992).
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takes for courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to litigate and
interpret the new laws. 199 According to Justice Steigmann, "Given
these costs, the benefits derived from all this legislative activity should
be carefully assessed. My assessment leaves me unpersuaded that all
this activity is justified."2
The flood of new laws has skewed what once was a carefully designed sentencing model. For instance, the seriousness of an offense
is, in theory, apparent from its statutory class, a concept codified in the
Unified Code of Corrections of 1973.0° Murder is the most serious
offense; a Class X offense is worse than a Class 1 offense, and a
Class 1 offense is worse than a Class 2 offense. Illinois sentencing
laws, however, no longer follow the "unified" or systematic pattern
implicit in their original design. This breakdown is apparent to practicing criminal attorneys who routinely navigate the maze of laws which
control sentences.
For example, as specified in the "Disposition" and "Sentence of Imprisonment" sections of the UCC, a Class 1 felony carries either a term
of probation, or a prison term of between four and fifteen years.20 2 A
Class 1 offender generally faces probation if he or she does not have a
prior record of convictions. As specified in the "Disposition" section
of the UCC, however, the Class 1 felony of criminal sexual assault
carries a term of imprisonment without the possibility of probation.2 3
Under the "truth" law, which modifies the "Early Release" section of
the UCC, the criminal sexual assault offender must serve eighty-five
percent of the minimum four-year sentence, or about three and onehalf years behind bars. 2 4
The Class 1 felony of compelling gang membership also carries a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment upon conviction. 20 ' The
four year sentence, however, is reduced both by day-for-day credit,
and by 180 days of credit for meritorious service. This Class 1
offense thus carries a mandatory minimum term of actual imprisonment of one and one-half years. This term may, however, be reduced
further because, under the "Early Release" section of the UCC, an inmate serving time for the offense of compelling gang membership
199. Id. (Steigmann, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Steigmann, J., concurring).
201. See Aspen, supra note 32, at 345.
202. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, §§ 5/5-5-3(b)(I), 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1992).
203. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-13(b) (West 1992); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(H) (West 1992).
204. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996)).
205. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-6.1, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730,
§ 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(J) (West 1992).
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qualifies for one and one-half days of good conduct credit for each day
that he or she is enrolled in an approved program after 1993.206 A
similar outcome occurs with the Class 1 felony of possession with intent to deliver five or more grams of cocaine, because judges must
sentence anyone found guilty of this offense to four years in prison. 0 7
Persons sentenced under this law will serve about one and one-half
years behind bars.
The lower category of Class 2 offenses carry a term of probation, or
a prison term of between three and five years. The Class 2 offense of
aggravated battery of a senior citizen, however, carries a mandatory
term of imprisonment. 2 8 It also falls within the "truth" law's automatic eighty-five percent category, so a conviction for this Class 2
offense carries a minimum term of over two and one-half years actual
imprisonment-one year behind bars more than the enhanced Class 1
felony of compelling gang membership.
Until 1995, aggravated battery of a child, which covers cases where
20
a child has been bruised, burned, scalded, or dangerously shaken, ,
had carried a possible sentence of probation. Regardless of the circumstances of the offense or the background of the offender, the
offense is now a Class X offense, punishable by a mandatory minimum term of at least six years in prison.2 1 ' Eighty-five percent of the
sentence must be served in prison, as the offense falls within the truthin-sentencing law.21 2 Persons sentenced under the law will therefore
serve, at a minimum, about five years and one month in prison.
By contrast, a person sentenced for another Class X offensearmed robbery-will, regardless of background, have his or her six
year mandatory sentence reduced by day-for-day good time under the
"Early Release" section of the UCC; under the same section, he or she
206. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West Supp. 1996) (including
offense carrying day-for-day good conduct credit); id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (qualifying for 180
days meritorious credit); id. § 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (qualifying for time and one-half credit).
207. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/401(c)(2) (West Supp. 1996); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1996).
208. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4.6 (West 1992); Witt, supra note 16, at
1161.
209. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996)).
210. People v. Renteria, 597 N.E.2d 714, 715 (III. App. Ist Dist. 1992) (child dangerously shaken); People v. Herr, 409 N.E.2d 442, 444 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1980) (child
burned).
211. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-4.3 (West Supp. 1996) (showing
amended classification to be a Class X offense); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-8l(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (setting a term of six years mandatory imprisonment for
Class X offenses).
212. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
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will have another 180 days shaved off the sentence, and qualify for
one and one-half days good conduct credit for each day that he or she
is enrolled in an approved program." 3 The armed robber will thus
serve less than two and one-half years in prison, which is less than
half the actual time which a parent with no record will spend behind
bars for a onetime incident of aggravated battery of a child. Such consequences will be only more frequent, as the complicated Code
continues to focus on the offense, to the exclusion of examining individual offenders.
A simple drug possession case can entail a number of possible
mandatory consequences. A person convicted of possession with intent to deliver one gram of cocaine faces probation,1 4 unless charged
as having committed the offense within 1000 feet of public housing or
a school. 1 5 If so charged, the offense is a Class X felony, and a
judge would have to sentence that person to at least six years in prison,
regardless of the offender's age or absence of a criminal record." 6 If
the offender was on bond for this offense and committed the same
offense, a judge would have to impose consecutive sentences--or
twelve years in prison.1 7 This term, however, would be halved by
various good time credits.
After navigating the relevant sections of the hundreds of pages
which comprise the Criminal Code and UCC, the extent to which Illinois' code of correction remains unified is difficult to discern. In the
practice of criminal law, the navigation of the disunified code becomes
more complex as a host of factors, mostly unrelated to the offender,
control the front door sentencing outcome. These factors include, for
example, "safe zones," gang enhancements, the nature of the victim,
an array of provisions mandating extended or consecutive terms, as
well as a three-strikes-you're out law. 2"8 After a practicing attorney or
a judge has determined the front door consequences, he or she must
analyze the back door consequences: is it a day-for-day or truth
offense? If the former, does it qualify for 180 or 90 days of meritori213. Id. §§ 5/3-6-3(a)(3), (a)(4).
214. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 570/401(c)(2) (West 1992).
215. Id. § 570/407(b)(1).
216. Id. §§ 570/404(b)(1), 570/401(a) (West 1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730,
§ 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996). In 1993, penalties increased for unlawful possession of firearms if committed in a "safe school zone," or in a public park or public housing. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/24-1(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996). Another new
"zone" enhancement covers persons who unlawfully sell firearms in a school zone, public park, or in public housing. This offense is now a Class 2 felony. Id.
217. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/32-10 (West Supp. 1996).
218. See supra parts II.E.2, 4, and II.F.2, 4, 7.
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ous good time, and does it qualify for day and one-half credits for participation in prison programs? If it is a truth offense, is it 100%, or
85%, and if the latter, is it an automatic 85% or is it subject to a judicial finding? Even the experienced attorney may go astray navigating
this maze. What hope then for the ordinary citizens with no golden
thread to guide them?
B. Sentencing by Offense Not Offender
The new focus on offense, rather than offender, has raised a conflict
between the new laws and provisions in the Criminal Code and the
Illinois Constitution, which both require that punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and recognize an offender's
potential for rehabilitation. According to the Illinois Constitution, for
example, "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship. ' 21 9 According to the Criminal Code,
one of its purposes is to "[p]rescribe penalties which are proportionate
to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differ22
ences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.,
These constitutional and statutory precepts clearly no longer guide Illinois' sentencing policy. The charged offense, not the circumstances
of the offense or the offender, is the relevant issue in sentencingunless a penalty enhancement is possible because of the nature of the
offense or the offender's criminal record.
C. Allocating a Scarce Resource -Prison Space
A confused sentencing policy frustrates the court system, causes
disproportionate and unjust results, and mystifies defendants and the
public. A confused sentencing policy is also a confused public choice
about how to allocate a scarce and costly resource-prison space.
Such confusion may result in unintended choices. Yet even if the
choices would be the same absent such confusion, the democratic process is better served when such choices are clear and explicit.
The demand for prison space has steadily grown. In 1973, the
IDOC housed 6100 inmates, a number which rose to 10,733 by 1978.
By 1985, the prison population had risen to 18,279. In less than ten
years the IDOC population had doubled: 36,543 inmates were serving
time in 1994.221 If history is a guide, new sentencing proposals will
219. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. 1, § 11.
220. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/1-2(c) (West 1992).
221.

ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 1994 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 4 (July 1995)

1996]

Truth-in-Sentencing

1019

continue to flow out of the General Assembly, and the prison population will continue to grow. Indeed, the Truth-in-Sentencing Commission is composed largely of political appointees and law enforcement
officials, and could call for longer prison terms, as it is charged with
assuring that "criminals serve the sentences handed down by the
courts.

222

The increasing demand for scarce prison space calls out for
informed choices about which offenders should spend time in prison,
and for how long. In Illinois, however, confusing layers of sentencing policy obscure these choices and lead to an uninformed, and possibly unintended allocation of scarce public resources.
Surprising effects of Illinois' multi-layered sentencing policy can be
seen in the imprisonment of drug offenders, which has grown at an
unprecedented rate. In 1985, the IDOC housed 851 drug offenders, or
4.7% of the inmate population. By 1994, 7874 drug offenders were
housed in the IDOC-21.5% of the inmate population. 223 There is
pronounced growth in the incarceration of minor drug offenders. For
example, possession of a controlled substance, such as cocaine, is a
Class 4 felony in Illinois. In 1994, there were 2395 Class 4 possession offenders admitted to Illinois' prisons.224 Almost as many in this
class of offender left prison that year-2169. The offenders served an
average of about one-half year in custody. 225 The increased incarceration of minor offenders-especially drug offenders-seems likely to
continue as the effects of recent sentencing enhancements, such as
those for offenses committed on bond or in "safe zones," work their
way through the criminal justice system.
Although the effect may not be immediate, automatic sentencing
enhancements can force unexpectedly large shifts in incarceration policy. For example, under the Class X law, a judge must sentence any
Class 1 or Class 2 offender over the age of twenty-one as a Class X
offender if he or she has previously been convicted two times before
of either a Class 1 or Class 2 felony. This law includes drug
offenders.226 In 1985, only eight inmates were serving time under this
provision. By 1992, the number had risen to 414. By 1994, however, the number of inmates serving time under this provision soared
[hereinafter IDOC PRESENTATION].
222. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/3-6-3.1(a) (West Supp. 1996).
223. IDOC PRESENTATION, supra note 221, at 9.
224. Id. at 90-91.
225. Id. at 47.
226. Aspen, supra note 32, at 348; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3(c)(8)
(West Supp. 1996).
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to 1305-a 215% increase in just two years. 227 A similar effect may
be developing as a consequence of the expansion of consecutive sentencing laws.
In 1994, consecutive sentences increased thirty-eight
228
percent.
As a consequence of Illinois' multi-layered sentencing policy, it
seems likely not just that the prison population will continue to grow,
but that the courts will continue to lock up more drug offenders and
more offenders caught in mandatory sentencing enhancements. If, as
seems likely, the General Assembly continues to pass sentencing
enhancements, the demand for prison space might someday force a
reassessment of the sentencing system. Such a reexamination may not
alter the balance of incarceration in Illinois, but it could yield a rational
public choice, weighing the costs of each incarceration decision against
its benefits.
D. Wiping the Slate Clean?
If Illinois is forced to reassess its sentencing system, it will have the
opportunity to examine the efforts of states that have grappled with the
costs and complexities of sentencing reform. North Carolina's
response--often referred to as "structured sentencing" or the "grid"has gained widespread attention. The grid system went into effect in
October of 1994.129 This model, the product of North Carolina's Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission, fixes sentences based upon
both the seriousness of offenses, which range from level A-such as
murder-through level I-such as lesser drug offenses, and the
offender's prior criminal record. The "grid" refers to a chart, in which
offense categories are listed on the left side by seriousness, and prior
criminal history, which is reduced to "points," is represented across
the top of the chart. At sentencing, a judge matches on the chart the
severity of the offense with the offender's criminal record, and finds
the proper sentencing range. For example, a level D offense such as
armed robbery falls within a forty-four to fifty-five month range before
various aggravating and mitigating factors are weighed. 23
227. IDOC PRESENTATION, supra note 221, at 21.
228. Id.at 82.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (Supp. 1995); Michael Tonry, Structured
Sentencing, in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 267 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1988) (reviewing structured sentencing models).
230. NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMMISSION, REVISED
SUMMARY OF NEW SENTENCING LAWS AND THE STATE-COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 8
(1994) [hereinafter N.C. COMMISSION]; William Claiborne, Making Sentences Fit the
Prisons, WASH. POST, July 16, 1994, at Al.
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The grid system fits the "truth-in-sentencing" mold, because sentences imposed by the courts match the actual time which the offender
will spend behind bars. Parole is eliminated. This feature qualifies
North Carolina for federal grants to construct prisons. The grid system also attempts to control corrections costs by targeting violent and
career offenders for prison, while less serious offenders are sentenced
to probation or go to day reporting centers, boot camps, house arrest,
or halfway houses.23 ' New sentencing enhancements must be accompanied by notes outlining their cost-a practice already in place in
Illinois.232
North Carolina also adopted a community corrections strategy to
impose intermediate sanction on the offender in the community
through probation, day reporting centers, boot camps, house arrest, or
halfway houses. 3 This approach, however, might cause two problems. First, law enforcement officials might argue that these alternative sentences should be targeted at offenders now under less restraint
rather than those currently in the prison system. Probationers, for
instance, would thus get more conditions and more supervision. According to this view, it would be "soft on crime" to give these intermediate sanctions to offenders now in the prison system. If this
approach is followed, prison admissions would not be reduced; more
minor offenders would be put under greater restraint. Second, these
intermediate sanctions take place locally.234 In Illinois, such a division
of jurisdiction could result in shifting sentencing costs to the counties.
In North Carolina,
State government covers these costs through grants
235
to counties.
North Carolina also sought to control enormous and costly growth
in its prison budget. Its reform was intended to cost no more than the

Claiborne, supra note 230, at Al; Penelope Lemov, Justice by the Grid,
Mar. 1994, at 27. The grid system does not expressly adopt capacity-based
sentencing, which adjusts the number of inmates who enter the prison system to meet
the system's capacity. This capacity management, in effect in Minnesota for a number
of years, was considered by an Illinois legislative commission in 1986.
231.

GOVERNING,

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AS A RESPONSE TO
SENTENCING REFORM: A STUDY AND SOME OBSERVATIONS 40 (1986).
That commission

took no action after objections were raised that it would be soft on criminals. Id. at 4446.
232. The Correctional Budget and Impact Note Act, Pub. Act No. 89-198, § 10, 1995
Ill. Legis. Serv. 2741, 2742-73 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 25,
§§ 701/1-12 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996)).
233. N.C. COMMISSION, supra note 230, at 3-4.
234. Id. at 3-5.
235. Id. at 31-35; Lemov, supra note 231, at 30.
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system which it replaced.236 In the absence of such a limit, the reform
might have become a means of enhancing more sentences. The benefits of North Carolina's reform might, however, be short-lived. The
North Carolina legislature has already returned to the practice of
enhancing sentences. New enhancements went into effect in December, 1995. 23 Time will tell if this is the beginning of a pattern.
V.

CONCLUSION

Illinois' sentencing system, built up by the unsystematic accretion of
sentencing policies and enhancements, has become so complicated and
confusing that few lawyers-not to mention the public or the
accused-can understand what specific legal consequences flow from
specific criminal conduct. Rather than clarifying the Code, "truth"
adds yet another layer to this system. This multi-layered system has
obscured the debate over how to spend the State's limited amount of
money to best incapacitate-or rehabilitate--offenders. As a consequence, it seems likely that Illinois will continue to lock up more drug
offenders, as well as others caught in mandatory sentencing enhancements.
If the Illinois General Assembly continues to pass sentencing enhancements, the increased demand for prison space might force a
reassessment of the sentencing system. The lessons from North
Carolina could help clarify our complex laws, shift the focus to some
degree on the offender, rather than solely on the offense, and limit the
growth in the prison system. While such a reexamination may not
alter the balance of incarceration in Illinois, it could yield a rational
public choice, one which weighs the costs of each incarceration decision against the benefits of incapacitation.

236. N.C. COMMISSION, supra note 230, at 5.
237. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-415.21 (Supp. 1995).

